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ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ (i.e. coordinated combination of financial
and nonfinancial services) on the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Using a global
data set of MFIs in 77 countries, we find that the provision of nonfinancial services does not harm
nor improve MFIs’ financial sustainability and efficiency. The results however suggest that the










Microfinance aims at providing financial services to
low-income households and microenterprises who
have been excluded from traditional banking. The
achievement of this goal has been universally recog-
nized (Biosca, Lenton, and Mosley 2014; Balkenhol
and Hudon 2011). Beside this primary social mission
of financial inclusion, microfinance institutions (MFIs)
also seek to remain financially sustainable. According
to Morduch (1999), this is the ‘win-win’ solution of
microfinance. Thus, MFIs are hybrid organization pur-
suing both social and financial objectives. Like banks
MFIs should be profitable or at least break-even, and
like social organizations MFIs should reach out to
unbanked clients and enhance their welfare.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the provision of
financial services to microentrepreneurs was often
done alongside nonfinancial services (social and
business development services) (Goldmark 2006).
The social services focused on improving clients’
welfare while the business development services
were offered to teach the clients basic financial man-
agement principles. This was believed to enhance
clients’ business success and thereby improve MFI’s
loan quality. This belief was however not supported
by early studies such as Kilby and D’Zmura (1985)
and Boomgard (1989).
While some MFIs continue to deliver nonfinan-
cial services in recent times, many others have
phased out the practice since the late 1990s
(Goldmark 2006). The focus on only financial ser-
vices (minimalist model) could among other things
be attributed to low impact of the training programs
and pressure to commercialize microfinance. Often
the training programs are counter-productive
because they are either of low quality or do not
meet the specific needs of the poor (Goldmark
2006; Yunus 2007).
Moreover, proponents of the minimalist approach
argue that access to credit alone is enough for the
poor to work themselves out of poverty. For
instance, Dr Muhammad Yunus, a renowned pio-
neer of microfinance, states that ‘rather than waste
our time teaching them new skills, we try to make
maximum use of their existing skills. Giving the
poor access to credit allows them to immediately
put into practice the skills they already know’
(Yunus 2007, 225). Another argument for the
minimalist approach is that, including ‘plus’ services
will have a negative influence on MFIs’ financial
sustainability. This argument is related to the
claimed trade-off between social mission and finan-
cial sustainability (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Morduch 2007; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
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Morduch 2011; Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters
2011). This can be described as a ‘win-loss’ situation
for the clients and MFIs, respectively.
However, the minimalist approach has been reas-
sessed (Lanao-Flores and Serres 2009) with an
increasing conclusion that the ‘microcredit, by itself,
is usually not enough’ (Reed 2011, 1). To this end,
some MFIs today still adopt the credit-plus model
(what we call microfinance ‘plus’) by bundling finan-
cial and nonfinancial services to clients. A typical
proponent of this model is Freedom from Hunger, a
US-based village banking organization. Proponents
argue that, the credit-plus model maximizes MFIs’
social impact (Dunford 2001).
About 27 per cent of MFIs in our sample adopt a
‘plus’ model while the remaining 73 per cent follow
the minimalist approach. The fact that some MFIs
are specialized while others are ‘plus’ providers
offers an interesting research setting. Thus, what
we set out to study in this article is to investigate
whether the microfinance ‘plus’ model is more ben-
eficial than the minimalist approach in terms of the
achievement of MFIs’ social and financial objectives.
This has not been addressed in the academic litera-
ture to the best of our knowledge. Empirical litera-
ture on the impact of microfinance ‘plus’ in general
is very limited (Biosca, Lenton, and Mosley 2014). In
addition, we adopt several estimation methods to
address potential endogeneity.
The relevance of this study is demonstrated by
recent concerns that the client’s impact of accessing
stand-alone credit has been overstated (Angelucci,
Karlan, and Zinman 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015).
These studies imply that providing only microcredit
as a solution to poverty is probably not adequate.
According to Armendáriz and Szafarz (2011), poor
households benefit from a combination of services,
rather than the simple provision of credit. Similarly,
Khandker (2005) argues that because poverty is mul-
tidimensional, poor people need access to a coordi-
nated combination of both financial and
nonfinancial services (e.g. business trainings) to
overcome poverty. Such developmental services are
crucial for making credit more productive and
impactful for the clients.
The arguments for the importance of the micro-
finance ‘plus’ (maximalist) approach are further sup-
ported by several studies documenting improved
clients’ impact when accessing credit in combination
with nonfinancial services or ‘plus’ services
(Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson 2001; Dunford
2001; Halder 2003; Karlan and Valdivia 2011;
McKernan 2002; Noponen and Kantor 2004; Smith
2002). A main problem with these studies, in addi-
tion to being case studies with relatively little exter-
nal validity, is that they focus on the impact of
microfinance ‘plus’ on clients, without considering
the outcomes for the MFIs. In contrast, this article
uses a global sample to investigate the potential
influence of microfinance ‘plus’ on the MFIs’
performance.
Since controversies persist between the minimalist
and maximalist approaches (Bhatt and Tang 2001;
Morduch 2000), it is the aim of this article to pro-
vide policymakers and practitioners with informed
information as to whether the provision of ‘plus’
services influences the financial and social perfor-
mance of MFIs. To achieve this aim, the article
focuses on two main questions: (1) do MFIs that
combine financial and nonfinancial services achieve
better financial performance, in terms of financial
sustainability, efficiency and portfolio quality, than
MFIs that deliver only financial services? and (2) do
microfinance ‘plus’ providers attain better social per-
formance, in terms of outreach, than their specialist
peers?
Using a unique sample of MFIs in 77 countries,
we find that there is no evidence of microfinance
‘plus’ influence on financial sustainability and effi-
ciency. The results however indicate that MFIs that
provide social services have higher repayment rates
and greater depth of outreach than those that do not.
Thus, bundling financial services with nonfinancial
further enhance the outreach mission of MFIs
(Dunford 2001).
The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we
discuss the concept of microfinance ‘plus’ and then
provide a conceptual framework on the impact of
such services on performance. This precedes the
hypothesis development. Section III presents the
data and the specific variables used in the estimation.
Section IV outlines the estimation procedure taking
into account endogeneity concerns. Section V pre-
sents and discusses the empirical results while
Section VI concludes the article with some remarks
for practitioners and policymakers.
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II. Conceptual framework: influence of
microfinance ‘plus’ on MFI performance
The concept of microfinance ‘plus’
Microfinance ‘plus’ services are any activities aside
financial services (Goldmark 2006) targeted at
improving both the welfare of poor people and
their businesses. An overall understanding of the
concept is relatively straightforward, but a more
detailed explanation is also possible. For example,
an MFI that provides savings, insurance, or money
transfers together with loans is not involved in
microfinance ‘plus’, because all its services are finan-
cial in nature. An MFI that provides informational
sessions to potential clients or trains existing clients
in the use of credit or the importance of repayment
is not practicing microfinance ‘plus’, nor is an MFI
that partners with another organization that pro-
vides clients with ‘plus’ services. Rather, a ‘plus’
service refers specifically to a nonfinancial service
provided by the MFI itself.
Various MFIs offer a wide variety of ‘plus’ ser-
vices, ranging from access to markets and business
development services (BDS) to health provision and
literacy training (Goldmark 2006; Maes and Foose
2006). In most cases, these ‘plus’ services are either
BDS or social services (Goldmark 2006). The former
aims to boost competitiveness by improving produc-
tivity, product design, service delivery or market
access (Sievers and Vandenberg 2007). These ser-
vices include (but not limited to) management or
vocational skills trainings, technical and marketing
assistance (Sievers and Vandenberg 2007; Goldmark
2006). Social services (e.g. health, nutrition, educa-
tion, etc.) on the other hand are intended to raise the
general welfare of clients.
Conceptual framework for the effects of
microfinance ‘plus’
Empirical studies on the impact of microfinance
‘plus’ programs on microenterprises are limited
(Biosca, Lenton, and Mosley 2014). One of the ear-
liest studies that evaluated the influence of ‘plus’
services in microfinance is McKernan (2002) who
finds positive effect of such services on clients’ prof-
itability. Other impact studies include Smith (2002)
Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010), Karlan and
Valdivia (2011) McKenzie and Woodruff (2013),
among others. The findings of these and other stu-
dies range from no significant impact of microfi-
nance ‘plus’ to mixed effects. However, what seem
not to be taken into account is that nonfinancial
services have the potential to influence not only the
outcome for the clients but may also influence the
performance of the MFI (Sievers and Vandenberg
2007).
Thus, this study examines the influence of micro-
finance ‘plus’ on the institution itself and not on the
clients. Although no clear-cut theory exists on the
link between microfinance ‘plus’ and performance,
we can use different theories from extant literature
to derive a framework that demonstrates potential
outcomes of microfinance ‘plus’ (Figure 1).
Specifically, we argue that microfinance ‘plus’ ser-
vices may have both positive and negative outcomes
on the performance of MFIs. By providing ‘plus’
services, an MFI could benefit from client loyalty,
potential clients, high repayment rates, self-sustain-
ability, better social outreach, and greater access to
client information (see top of Figure 1). On the other
hand, the microfinance ‘plus’ model comes with
some challenges for the provider. Among other
things, the MFI may suffer from increased costs,
resource constraints and lower client retention. (see
bottom of Figure 1).
Client loyalty
A key benefit of adding ‘plus’ services to microfi-
nance is the stimulation of client loyalty (Sievers and
Vandenberg 2007). If the ‘plus’ services improve
client satisfaction, they should help increase reten-
tion rates. Such an increase in retention rate was
confirmed by Karlan and Valdivia (2011) in their
randomized control trial study from Peru Another
example from Financiera Solucion, also shows that
the institution benefits from including management
training because it can better retain clients (Sievers
and Vandenberg 2007) which is of course beneficial
for the MFI (Reichheld 1996).
Potential clients
MFIs providing nonfinancial services have the
opportunity to earn a comparative advantage in
terms of attracting new clients (Khandker 2005;
Mosley and Hulme 1998) especially in the increasing
competition in microfinance markets (McIntosh and
Wydick 2005). Attracting more clients improves the
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financial sustainability of the MFI because of scale
economies (Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland 2013).
And, obviously, having more clients could be equa-
ted with greater breadth of microfinance outreach
mission.
High repayment rates
Microfinance ‘plus’ can help reduce the risk of
default. Relevant training programs could for exam-
ple increase the clients’ business success while train-
ings on how to invest loans could help borrowers
avoid using loans for consumption purpose rather
than productive activities (Marconi and Mosley
2006). For instance, Karlan and Valdivia (2011)
find some evidence of improved repayment rates
arising from microfinance ‘plus’. Giné and Mansuri
(2014) however do not find evidence of improved
repayment rates following clients’ participation in
business training programs.
Self-sustainability
Since borrowers are often limited by their lack of
knowledge they often end up doing petty trade
where even negative return on capital is a possible
outcome (De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008).
‘Plus’ services may motivate better investments with
higher potential returns which could enhance loan
repayment rates. Likewise, with improved human
capital the clients may be able to service bigger
loans which enhances the financial performance of
MFIs (Hartarska, Shen, and Mersland 2013). Finally,
‘plus’ services might be offered for a fee resulting in
a positive profit margin for the MFI (Sievers and
Vandenberg 2007).
Greater social outreach
By providing ‘plus’ services an MFI maximizes its
social mission with a wide range of social services
such as health education (Dunford 2001). Although
MFIs aim to reach poor people, most of them access
the ‘upper poor’ more than the ‘very poor’ (Mosley
2001). In addition, pressure from governments and
donors to ensure financial sustainability leads many
MFIs to ignore social protection objectives and tar-
get less risky clients. Therefore, a major argument in
support of the microfinance ‘plus’ approach is that it
might enable MFIs to reach poorer and more vul-
nerable clients compared to the minimalist model
(Halder 2003; Maes and Foose 2006). After all, other
antipoverty modalities including primary health and
education may be more effective than microfinance
when wishing to enhance the welfare of the poorest
sectors (Mosley 2001). Of course, providing ‘plus’
services is not devoid of potential disadvantages for
the MFI as outlined in the following.
Increased costs
The microfinance ‘plus’ approach may come with
additional operational and administrative costs for
the MFI. A study of four Freedom from Hunger
affiliates reveals that the direct cost of including
learning sessions, related to family, health, nutrition,
Microfinance ‘plus’ outcomes
• Increased costs
• Additional resources required
• Lower client retention
• Customer loyalty
• Potential customers
• High repayment rates
• Financial Self-sustainability
• Greater social outreach
• Access to client information




Figure 1. Effects of microfinance ‘plus’ on microfinance institutions’ performance.
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business development and self-confidence,
accounted for between 4.7 and 10 per cent of each
MFI’s operational costs (Vor Der Bruegge, Dickey,
and Dunford 1999). Also, Dunford (2001) docu-
ments that combining financial and education ser-
vices offers benefits for borrowers but increases the
costs for the MFI.
Additional resources required
The provision of ‘plus’ services requires additional
resources (e.g. time, money, staff, etc.) from the
institution. It increases administrative burdens and
may distract managers and other staff from credit
administration, which could decrease repayment
rates (Berger 1989). Since many MFIs are already
struggling with being financially self-sustainable,
adopting the maximalist model may make them
worse-off. Probably, the difficulty in being self-sus-
tainable makes some MFIs unwilling to incorporate
nonfinancial services into their business models.
Lower client retention
Just as the provision of specific and relevant ‘plus’
services could lead to client loyalty, poor quality or
irrelevance of such services could also lead to client
dissatisfaction. Some evidence shows that microfi-
nance borrowers do not consider training useful and
do not retain or apply their acquired knowledge, such
that time spent in training appears to be an opportu-
nity cost for credit (Goldmark 2006). In this regards,
dissatisfied clients are more likely to stop doing busi-
ness with ‘plus’ providers (Sievers and Vandenberg
2007). On the other hand, the positive outcomes of
business training on clients’ business success may also
result in reduced client retention because successful
microenterprises may progress to the formal banking
sector (Karlan and Valdivia 2011).
Based on the conceptual framework above, we
formulate our testable hypotheses. Given that provi-
ders of ‘plus’ services benefit from client loyalty, pos-
sibility to attract new clients, and income realized
from demand-driven ‘plus’ services, our first hypoth-
esis is that MFIs providing ‘plus’ services are likely to
perform financially better than specialized MFIs.
Second, there is some evidence that ‘plus’ services,
especially BDS, may improve the creditworthiness of
borrowers resulting in higher repayment rates (e.g.
Karlan and Valdivia 2011). Therefore, we hypothe-
size that repayment rates in MFIs providing ‘plus’
services are higher than in specialized MFIs. Since
the positive creditworthiness effect probably holds
only for BDS providers, and not for SS ‘plus’ provi-
ders, we hypothesize that BDS ‘plus’ providers are
more effective in improving financial performance
than SS ‘plus’ providers.
Third, many studies (e.g. Vor Der Bruegge,
Dickey, and Dunford 1999; Dunford 2001) suggest
that ‘plus’ services come with additional costs for the
institutions. Therefore, we hypothesize that ‘plus’
providers will experience higher costs ratios than
specialists.
Finally, we hypothesize that ‘plus’ providers per-
form better socially than MFIs providing only finan-
cial services. Moreover, to distinguish which ‘plus’
services lead to higher social performance, we
hypothesize that the social performance of SS provi-
ders is better than for BDS providers. However, we
must highlight that there are potential trade-offs
between social and financial performance of MFIs
(Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) which
could become evident in our results.
III. Data and variables definitions
Data
The dataset is hand collected from rating reports
from the five leading rating agencies in the micro-
finance industry; i.e. Microrate, Microfinanza, Planet
Rating, Crisil and M-CRIL. The rating reports are
narratives consisting of contextual and MFI-specific
information including accounting details, organiza-
tional features and benchmarks. The reports are not
fully standardized and therefore differ in their
emphasis and in the amount of information avail-
able. The result is that not all reports have informa-
tion on all variables. When necessary, all numbers in
the dataset have been annualized and dollarized
using the official exchange rates from the given
time. All together we used observations of 478
rated MFIs from 77 countries1 spanning the period
1998–2012.
No dataset is perfectly representative of the
microfinance field. Ours contains relatively fewer
1The number of MFIs per country is available from the authors upon request.
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mega-sized MFIs and does not cover all small sav-
ings and credit cooperatives. The former are rated by
agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s; the
latter are not rated. However, our use of rating
reports should be relevant for studying the effects
of microfinance ‘plus’, because MFIs that are rated
have a common interest in accessing funding and
increasing their sustainability. The data set includes
specialists and providers of ‘plus’ services, so it
enables meaningful comparisons. For a further




We focus on financial sustainability, efficiency and
portfolio quality as measures of financial perfor-
mance and outreach as a measure of the social per-
formance of MFIs.
Financial sustainability measures
We consider the operational self-sufficiency ratio
(OSS) as a main indicator of financial performance.
This ratio demonstrates the ability of MFIs to be
fully sustainable in the long run, in the sense that
they can cover all their operating costs and maintain
the value of their capital. As a robustness check, we
include financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and return on
assets (ROA) measures. Operational self-sufficiency,
financial self-sufficiency and return on assets have
been used widely to measure the financial sustain-
ability of MFIs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch
2007; 2011; Mersland and Strøm 2009).
Efficiency measures
We use four indicators for efficiency. The operating
expense ratio which measures the MFI’s operating
expenses compared with the annual average loan
portfolio. A decrease in this ratio implies an increase
in efficiency. Since MFIs offering small loans will
look worse than MFIs offering large loans we also
include the cost per client variable (Rosenberg 2009).
Next, we employ the ratio of credit clients per loan
officer as well as credit clients per staff member to
evaluate how ‘plus’ activities influence the employ-
ment of personnel resources in the MFI.
Loan portfolio quality measures
We use two indicators of portfolio quality. First, the
portfolio at risk beyond 30 days (PAR30) reveals the
potential for future losses based on the current per-
formance of the portfolio. Second, the write-off ratio
measures the actual amount of loans that have been
written off as unrecoverable during a given period of
time, in relation to the outstanding loan portfolio.
The variables have been used in previous studies
(e.g. D’Espallier, Guerin, and Mersland (2011)).
Social performance measures
To evaluate social performance, we use three indica-
tors of outreach: number of clients, average loan size
and percentage of women clients. First, the number
of clients serves as a proxy for the ‘breadth of out-
reach’ (Rosenberg 2009; Schreiner 2002). For the
‘depth of outreach’, i.e. economic poverty level of
the clients, we apply average loan size and share of
female borrowers. We recognize that average loan
size and share of female borrowers are rough proxies
for ‘depth of outreach’ (for a discussion of their
shortcomings see Armendáriz and Szafarz 2011),
though still the most commonly used variables to
measure clients poverty level (Hermes, Lensink, and
Meesters 2011; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch
2009; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007;
Ahlin, Lin, and Maio 2011; Schreiner 2002;
Mersland and Strøm 2009).
Independent variables
We distinguish three types of MFI services: (1) spe-
cialized financial services only, (2) financial services
and BDS and (3) financial services and social ser-
vices (SS). We include BDS and SS dummies, as well
as a constant in our estimates. BDS equals 1 if the
MFI provides BDS and 0 otherwise. Similarly, SS
equals 1 if the MFI provides social services and 0
otherwise.
Control variables
To control for macroeconomic institutional differ-
ences, we include annual percentage growth rate of
gross domestic product (GDP) (based on constant
2005 U.S. dollars) (GDP growth) and inflation
(Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 2001;
Lensink and Hermes 2004). To further control for
country influence, we include the countries’ scores
on the human development index (HDI). HDI is a
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composite index that combines three dimensions of
human development: education, economy and life
expectancy. Finally, we include regional as well
time dummies in all estimations.
To control for MFI-specific characteristics, we
include number of credit officers since the number
of field officers may be driving the results and not
the ‘plus’ service itself. We further control for the
size by including the total assets of the MFI. The
lending methodology, either group based or indivi-
dual has the potential to influence efficiency levels,
repayment as well as outreach, thus we include group
lending as a control variable regarding the repay-
ment of credits (Hulme and Mosley 1996; Morduch
1999). It enhances the repayment rates due to peer
pressure from other group members (Ledgerwood
1999). Furthermore, it is cost efficient to offer
group loans due to scale economies. Group loans
are less risky than are those to individuals because
of better screening, monitoring, auditing and enfor-
cement (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). Thus, we
expect MFIs offering group loans to have improved
portfolio quality and high efficiency than those offer-
ing individual loans. Also, in line with Mersland,
Randøy, and Strøm (2011) and Mersland,
D’espallier, and Supphellen (2013), we control for
MFI experience (age), whether the MFI is a member
of an international network, and whether it was
initiated by a religious organization. Finally, we con-
trol for the organizational form of the MFI (NGO,
Bank, Cooperative, and Non-Bank financial institu-
tion, and state banks). Table 1 presents a summary
of all the variables.
IV. Estimation approach
We employ panel data modelling to examine the
potential effects of microfinance ‘plus’ on the finan-
cial and social performance of MFIs. Thus, we spe-
cify our panel model as follows:
yijt ¼ β0 þ β1BDSijt þ β2SSijt þ γMjt
þ τMFijt þ ci þ εijt (1)
where the dependent variable yijt is a measure of
financial and social performance of the ith MFI
located in country jth at time t, and β0 is a constant
term. BDSijt equals 1 if the ith MFI is a ‘plus’ provi-
der that integrates BDS and 0 if it is a specialist or a
‘plus’ provider that integrates social services in coun-
try j at time t; SSijt equals 1 if the i
th MFI is a ‘plus’
provider of social services and 0 if it is a specialist or
‘plus’ provider that integrates BDS in country j at
time t. Furthermore, Mjt is a vector of control vari-
ables describing the macroeconomic environment in
country j at time t; MFijt is a vector of control
variables describing the features of the ith MFI in
Table 1. Variable descriptions.
Variables Description
Operational self-sufficiency Operating revenue/(Financial expense + loan loss provision expense + operating expense)
Financial self-sufficiency Adjusted operating revenue/adjusted (financial expense + loan loss provision expense + operating expense)
Return on Assets Net operating income/average total assets
Portfolio at risk (PAR30) Portfolio at Risk > 30 days/Gross portfolio
Write-off ratio Write-off of loans/Average gross portfolio
Clients Number of active clients
Average loan size Amount issued in the period/Number of issued loans
Women Percentage of female clients
Operating expense ratio Operating expenses/average gross loan portfolio
Cost per client ratio Operating expenses/number of active clients
Staff productivity Number of active borrowers/Number of staff
Loan officer productivity Number of active borrowers/Number of loan officers
BDS 1 if MFI provides business development services, 0 otherwise
SS 1 if MFI provides social services, 0 otherwise
Group lending 1 if MFI uses group lending methodology, 0 otherwise
MFI experience (age) Number of years the MFI has been in operation
Credit officers Number of credit officers an MFI has at the end of year
Assets Total assets of the MFI
Bank 1 if a MFI is registered as a bank, 0 otherwise
Nonbank 1 if a MFI is registered as a non-financial institution, 0 otherwise
NGO 1 if a MFI is registered as non-governmental organization, 0 otherwise
Coop 1 if a MFI is registered as a cooperative, 0 otherwise
International network 1 if the MFI is member of an international network, 0 otherwise
Religious organization 1 if the MFI was initiated by an organization with a religious agenda, 0 otherwise
GDP growth Annual GDP growth (based on constant 2005 US dollars)
HDI Human Development Index
Inflation Annual inflation rate
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county jth at time t;ci is the MFI’s individual unob-
served effects; and εijt is mean-zero errors.
First, we use the random effects model (RE)
because our main variables of interest (i.e. BDS and
SS) are time invariant and a fixed-effects model (FE)
is impossible. However, the rejections of Hausman
test null hypothesis in our results show that FE is
consistent. Therefore, our second estimator is the
Hausman–Taylor’s (HT). This estimator distin-
guishes between regressors that are uncorrelated
with FEs and those that are potentially correlated
with them. Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest
using an economics intuition to determine which
variables should be treated as potentially correlated
with the FE. The model also distinguishes time-vary-
ing from time-invariant regressors. The model is as
follows.
yijt ¼ β0 þ X1ijtβ1 þ X2ijtβ2 þW1ijγ1
þW2ijγ2 þ ci þ εijt (2)
where the dependent variable yijt is a measure of
performance of the ith MFI located in country j at
time t; β0 is a constant term; X denotes time-varying
regressors: Inflation, GDP growth, MFI size, MFI
experience, Credit officers, HDI, and W denote time-
invariant regressors; International network, Religious
organization, BDS, SS, Group lending, Coop, bank,
NGO, non-bank and ci are MFI-specific unobserved
effects; and εijt is idiosyncratic errors. Regressors with
subscripts 1 are uncorrelated with ci, whereas those
with subscripts 2 are specified as correlated with ci. All
regressors are assumed uncorrelated with εijt.
2
The MFI’s choice to integrate financial and ‘plus’
services depends substantially on its specific character-
istics. Therefore, we treat BDS and SS as endogenous.
We similarly assume that group lending is endogenous
and must be instrumented. The same holds for the
number of credit officers. Group lending offers an
excellent platform for the delivery of ‘plus’ services
alongside microfinance (MkNelly et al. 1996). The deci-
sion to provide individual or group lending also
depends on the presence of some MFI-specific charac-
teristics. The remaining control variables are treated as
exogenous.
The validity of instruments used in the Hausman–
Taylor model is tested by Sargan-Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of
this test is that the instruments are valid. If the test
results reject the null hypothesis (which is the case in
this study), it suggests that there are endogeneity pro-
blems other than fixed effects. This leads us to the use
of Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM (general-
ised method of moments) estimator which uses lagged
differences of the dependent variable as instruments
for equations in levels, in addition to lagged levels of
dependent variable for equations in the first differences
(Baltagi 2013).
V. Results and discussions
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables
used in the estimations. On average, an MFI can
cover operational costs from revenue 1.13 times,
indicating that the MFI is self-sustainable. However,
OSS does not depict the intrinsic self-sustainability of
the MFI because of the presence of subsidies and that
is what FSS corrects for. The mean value for FSS is
0.95 which shows that on average, MFIs in our sam-
ple are not financially self-sustainable. Returns on
assets has a mean value of 2.4 per cent. In terms of
outreach, the average MFI has about 15,000 clients of
which 66 per cent are women and the average loan
amount disbursed (scaled by GDP per capita) is USD
1.30. With respect to loan quality, on average, about 6
per cent of the total loan portfolio is in arrears over
30 days and 1.4 per cent is written off as loan loss.
Concerning efficiency dimension, an MFI has on
average, operational costs of 25 per cent of gross
loan portfolio, cost per client of USD 118.65, 132
borrowers per staff, and 272 borrowers per loan
officer.
Furthermore, about 25 and 26 per cent of MFIs
offer business development and social services,
respectively. The average MFI has about: USD 11.3
million of total assets, 10 years of industry experi-
ence and 38 credit officers. Approximately, 37 per
cent of the MFIs are members of an international
network, 17 per cent of them (MFIs) were started by
religious organizations and 19 per cent offer group
loans only. In terms of legal status, about 51 per cent
of the MFIs are NGOs, 29 per cent are nonbank
2The Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator assumes that the exogenous variables serve as their own instruments; X2ijt is instrumented by its deviation from
individual means; and W2ij is instrumented by X1ij .
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financial institutions, 13 per cent are cooperatives
and 5 per cent are banks. Finally, the mean values
for GDP growth, inflation and HDI are 5.2 per cent,
6.1 per cent and 0.606, respectively.3
The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI
performance: random effects
First, we present the results of the RE estimator.
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of micro-
finance ‘plus’ on financial sustainability. The statis-
tics show that we pass the Hausman’s test in models
(1) and (2) as the p-values are greater than 0.05 but
fail in model (3) because the p-value is less than 0.05.
The Wald’s chi-squared test is significant showing
that our models are correctly specified, and our
regressors explain up to 27 per cent of the variance
of the outcome variables (model 2) and as low as 17
per cent (model 3). The results show that BDS and
SS are statistically insignificant suggesting that they
have no effect on the financial sustainability of MFIs.
As for the control variables we observe that HDI
is negatively associated with the FSS while MFI size
significantly enhances financial sustainability. As
expected, inflation reduces financial self-sustainabil-
ity of MFIs because it increases their cost of produc-
tion. The results further indicate that MFIs with
large number of loan officers tend to reduce finan-
cial sustainability in terms of OSS, FSS and ROA.
Similarly, MFIs with religious orientation have lower
financial sustainability compared to those without,
while group lending is associated with increased
ROA. Finally we observe than any ownership type
is better than being state owned when it comes to
financial sustainability. Finally, group lending is
associated with increased returns on assets.
Table 4 also presents RE results on the link
between microfinance ‘plus’ and efficiency. Like in
Table 3, BDS and SS are not significant and thus,
have no effect on MFIs’ efficiency.4
Next, we provide the RE estimates on the link
between microfinance ‘plus’ and loan quality.
Table 5 lists the results and it is clearly shown that
BDS does not affect loan quality in terms of portfolio
at risk and write-offs but SS has positive outcome on
the former suggesting that providing social services
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Operational self-sufficiency 1.128241 0.3678306 0.075 2.96
Financial self-sufficiency 0.9484163 0.3047077 0.063 3.469
Return on assets 0.0240719 0.0858322 −0.373 0.373
Number of clients 15,008.51 18,951.42 24 98,639
Average loan size 1.296353 2.826229 0.027 35.72
Percentage of women 0.6646034 0.2601223 0.000 1.000
Portfolio at risk 0.0601583 0.0689986 0.001 0.39
Write-off ratio 0.0135395 0.0196164 0.000 0.099
Write-off ratio (log) −5.053952 1.616904 −6.907 0.948
Operating expense ratio 0.2458689 0.1269165 0.016 0.6
Cost per client 118.648 107.004 0.242 574.99
Borrowers per staff member 132.1854 111.304 1 1893
Borrowers per loan officer 272.4617 159.7607 3 989
Assets 11,301,397.26 24,831,411.8 19,288 279,350,816
MFI age 9.782793 5.828356 0 29
Group lending 0.1923767 0.3942558 0 1
Credit officers 38.10859 39.05367 1 199
International network 0.3729858 0.483713 0 1
Religious organization 0.1685289 0.3744224 0 1
BDS 0.2524664 0.4345248 0 1
SS 0.2699552 0.4440358 0 1
Bank 0.0483496 0.2145538 0 1
Nonbank 0.2924221 0.454981 0 1
NGO 0.5099954 0.5000163 0 1
Coop 0.1338912 0.3406146 0 1
GDP growth 5.206064 3.175086 −14.149 17.33
Inflation 0.0611677 0.0487948 −0.185 0.287
HDI 0.6060426 0.1358599 0.058 0.806
3Testing (unreported) for multicollinearity problems indicates that none of the correlation values are above cut-off point of 0.90 (Hair et al. 2010). The only
correlation close to the cut-off point is that of BDS and SS (0.84) indicating that if MFIs offer ‘plus’ services they often offer both BDS and SS.
4Because of space constraints we do not comment on the control variables included in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
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enhances repayment rates. Our interpretation is that
the provision of social services enhances clients’
loyalty and therefore also their repayment of loans.
Thus, clients find the SS services relevant. The
finding that MFIs do not improve repayment rates
over time is not necessarily surprising since more
experienced MFIs can allow a larger share of their
clients to be in arrears.
Table 6 presents the last set of RE estimates on the
link between microfinance ‘plus’ and social perfor-
mance. SS is significantly and positively related to
women suggesting that the provision of social ser-
vices maximizes MFIs’ outreach efforts (Dunford
2001). BDS on the other hand is insignificant and
hence has no effect on social performance.
The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI
performance: fixed effects present
The results of the Hausman’s specification test pre-
sented in Table 3–6 suggest that there are fixed
effects as we did not pass the test in some of the
models (e.g. 3, 4, 5). To account for fixed effects, we
use the HT estimator which uses exogenous regres-
sors as instruments. The results for the financial
sustainability are presented in Table 7 while the
results for the efficiency, repayment and outreach
effects are available from authors upon request. We
pass the Sargan-Hansen test with p-values greater
0.05 in all models (Table 7) suggesting that our
instruments are valid. We however fail the test espe-
cially in three models for efficiency (unreported).
Generally, the results in the HT models mirror
those of the random effects models reported in
Table 3–6 – the provision of ‘plus’ services does
not have significant effect on the MFI’s performance.
However, the rejection of the null hypothesis of valid
instruments suggests that the results may be biased;
there are real endogeneity problems aside fixed
effects. Next, we employ the system GMM to
account for potential endogeneity issues.
The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI
performance: endogeneity present
Table 8 reports system GMM results on the link
between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustain-
ability of MFIs. The statistics show that there is
first-order serial correlation as the p-values of AR
(1) are all less than 0.05 but no second-order serial
correlation (p-values >0.05). We pass the Hansen’s
test of overidentifying restrictions indicating joint
validity of instruments set (all p-values >0.05). All
Table 3. The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial
sustainability.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables OSS FSS ROA
BDS 0.0089 −0.0214 −0.0067
(0.0333) (0.0270) (0.0095)
SS −0.0060 0.0030 0.0072
(0.0292) (0.0249) (0.0097)
HDI −0.2367 −0.2811** −0.0170
(0.1769) (0.1408) (0.0642)
GDP growth 0.0023 0.0057* 0.0013
(0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0010)
MFI size 0.1342*** 0.1075*** 0.0248***
(0.0207) (0.0159) (0.0038)
MFI experience −0.0069 −0.0072 0.0005
(0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0007)
Inflation −0.1548 −0.7004*** 0.0737
(0.2662) (0.2398) (0.0677)
Credit officers −0.0026*** −0.0017*** −0.0004***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0001)
International network −0.0399 0.0109 0.0003
(0.0471) (0.0358) (0.0086)
Religious organization −0.0463 −0.0837* −0.0193*
(0.0534) (0.0430) (0.0100)
NGO 0.3541 0.3995*** 0.0346
(0.3560) (0.1318) (0.0457)
Non-bank 0.2093 0.3175** 0.0170
(0.3557) (0.1261) (0.0459)
Bank 0.3720 0.3933*** 0.0385
(0.3645) (0.1462) (0.0473)
Coop 0.3281 0.4057*** 0.0306
(0.3565) (0.1368) (0.0466)
Group lending 0.0447 0.0333 0.0187***
(0.0329) (0.0264) (0.0065)
Constant −0.8750* −0.7562*** −0.3634***
(0.4797) (0.2712) (0.0853)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 628 654 1,104
Number of MFIs 196 211 317
Hausman test (p-value) 0.7758 0.4205 0.0016
R-squared (overall) 0.2071 0.2658 0.1688
Chi-squared 142.12*** 306.36*** 133.38***
This table lists Random effects results of the link between microfinance
‘plus’ and financial sustainability of MFIs. OSS is operational self-sustain-
ability and measures the ability of MFI to cover its operational costs from
revenue, FSS is financial self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI
to cover operational costs from revenue without subsidies and ROA is
returns on assets. BDS = 1 if MFI provides business development services,
0 = otherwise, and SS = 1 if MFI provides social services, 0 = otherwise.
MFI size is the natural logarithm of total assets, MFI experience is the
number of years the MFI has been in operation, and Credit officers is the
number of credit officers at the end of the year. Group lending = 1 if MFI
offers group loans, 0 = otherwise, International network = 1 if MFI is a
member of international network, 0 = otherwise, Religious organization = 1
if MFI was started by a religious organization, 0 = otherwise. NGO = 1 if
the MFI is registered as a nongovernmental organization, 0 = otherwise,
Non-bank = 1 if the MFI is registered as a non-bank financial institution,
0 = otherwise, Bank = 1 if the MFI is registered as a bank, 0 = otherwise,
and Coop = 1 if the MFI is registered as a cooperative, 0 = otherwise. GDP
growth is the real annual Gross Domestic Product growth rate, Inflation is
annual producer price index, and HDI is human development index. In
parentheses are robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
respectively.
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the lags of the dependent variables are statistically
significant at least at the 5 per cent level. Once again,
neither BDS nor SS are significantly associated with
the financial sustainability confirming the results
previously reported. Likewise, we find that the
GMM regressions do not result in significant find-
ings for the effect of BDS or SS on the efficiency,
repayment or social outreach of the MFI
(unreported).
A concern with the system GMM estimates
relates primarily to our time-invariant regressors
(i.e. BDS and SS) as their lagged values cannot be
used as instruments because their lagged first dif-
ferences are zero. This leaves us with first differ-
ences of time-varying variables which
unfortunately cannot be valid instruments either
because they suffer from Nickell’s bias (Nickell
1981) and do not also correlate sufficiently with
the observed BDS and SS. Thus, the estimates of
the system GMM are also problematic. Therefore,
the random effects estimates are preferred because
of the nature of our variables of interests which
get wiped out if the fixed-effects model is used and
their estimation in the HT model is not appropri-
ate due to invalidity of instruments. In any case,
results from the three estimators (RE, HT and
system GMM) suggest that microfinance ‘plus’ do
not influence overall performance of MFIs. Only
in few cases the RE estimates provide some evi-
dence of improved loan quality and outreach and
Table 4. The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI efficiency.
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Operating expenses Cost per client Staff productivity Credit officer productivity
BDS 0.0046 −11.1686 −6.4027 −13.6241
(0.0092) (8.2730) (4.6786) (9.7459)
SS −0.0006 7.3049 1.8171 1.3546
(0.0102) (7.2725) (4.6595) (10.1066)
HDI −0.1051 100.1630 84.3848* 61.4425
(0.0999) (76.6951) (44.5177) (117.7688)
GDP growth 0.0010 −1.8255** 0.6072 0.8140
(0.0011) (0.7907) (0.6034) (1.3391)
MFI size −0.0551*** 12.6214* 16.3686*** 39.5467***
(0.0066) (6.7782) (3.6843) (7.1674)
MFI experience −0.0009 0.2095 0.7911 1.9210
(0.0015) (1.2514) (0.8511) (1.7786)
Inflation −0.0367 −6.5753 −82.5389** −165.1948*
(0.0876) (62.6171) (41.7542) (86.9073)
Credit officers 0.0006*** −0.3000** −0.2736** −1.2017***
(0.0002) (0.1443) (0.1184) (0.2305)
International network 0.0463*** −8.9624 21.2268** 58.0469***
(0.0147) (10.9173) (9.9890) (19.0053)
Religious organization −0.0235 −6.6840 26.6914* 17.3264
(0.0167) (13.1452) (15.0120) (23.1394)
NGO −0.0829** 4.1400 −31.1030 −28.3443
(0.0382) (37.1670) (18.9918) (37.8816)
Non-bank −0.0907** 31.7750 −40.0253** −39.4110
(0.0373) (36.5450) (18.8842) (35.8501)
Bank −0.0599 −16.4869 −76.2367** −19.1276
(0.0449) (47.5149) (30.9760) (57.5899)
Coop −0.1948*** −29.9296 −76.8696*** −69.6188
(0.0416) (39.1691) (22.6003) (42.7219)
Group lending −0.0137** −2.0071 0.4042 8.5278
(0.0067) (6.0482) (3.9206) (8.6970)
Constant 1.2140*** −152.1842 −135.6015** −334.4640**
(0.1207) (111.7720) (63.4283) (132.5162)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 994 960 1,123 1,106
Number of MFIs 295 278 315 313
Hausman test (p-value) 0.0001 0.0002 0.9036 1.0000
R-squared (overall) 0.3410 0.2724 0.1924 0.2093
Chi-squared 334.69*** 266.08*** 172.43*** 154.27***
This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and MFI efficiency. Operating expense is total operating expenses as a
percentage of average gross loan portfolio, Cost per client is total operating expenses as a percentage of number of active clients, Staff productivity is the
number of active borrowers per staff, and Credit officer productivity is the number of active borrowers per credit officer. Regressors are defined previously.
In parentheses are the robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.
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thus support our hypotheses on these dimensions
of performance.
VI. Conclusion
This article set out to examine the potential impact
of microfinance ‘plus’ on the financial and social
performance of MFIs. Impact studies of nonfinancial
services have always used the clients as their unit of
analysis. In contrast, this article focuses on the pro-
viders of ‘plus’ services. Using a unique global sam-
ple of MFIs and an arsenal of estimation methods,
we find insignificant impact of BDS on MFIs’ finan-
cial and social performance. Furthermore, we find
only meagre evidence of improved loan quality and
outreach with the provision of social services.
Specifically, providing social services comes with
lower portfolio at risk and more women clients
though these findings are not stable across estima-
tion methods.
Thus, this article provides a first-hand informa-
tion on the outcome of microfinance ‘plus’ from the
perspective of the providers. Overall, it appears there
is no performance disparity for those MFIs provid-
ing ‘plus’ services and those that do not. Perhaps, the
benefits of microfinance ‘plus’ might have been









GDP growth −0.0023*** −0.0244
(0.0006) (0.0206)
MFI size −0.0055 0.0935
(0.0033) (0.0701)




Credit officers 0.0001 −0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0021)
International network −0.0234*** −0.1109
(0.0073) (0.1565)














Time dummies Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1,001 1,087
Number of MFIs 298 301
Hausman test (p-value) chi2 < 0 0.4105
R-squared (overall) 0.1640 0.0913
Chi-squared 117.50*** 228.54***
This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance
‘plus’ and loan portfolio quality of MFIs. PaR30 is nonperforming loans
over 30 days, and Write-off is natural logarithm of the proportion of loans
portfolio that have been written off as loan loss. Regressors are defined
previously. In parentheses are robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
respectively.










BDS −602.9183 −0.0212 −0.0098
(777.4759) (0.1556) (0.0443)
SS 597.1599 0.0755 0.0899**
(699.2822) (0.1505) (0.0431)
HDI 3,861.4355 −1.6081 0.4286**
(5,486.8614) (1.4455) (0.2067)
GDP growth 110.2542 −0.0238 0.0143**
(83.0698) (0.0348) (0.0065)
MFI size 1,933.2793*** 0.1736* −0.0615***
(516.9265) (0.1006) (0.0202)
MFI experience 142.4659 −0.0321 0.0038
(115.0366) (0.0349) (0.0043)
Inflation −5,247.5854 −2.1151 −0.5878*
(6,821.1764) (2.8034) (0.3159)
Credit officers 222.4752*** −0.0022 0.0009**
(21.2049) (0.0038) (0.0004)
International network 2,452.8597* −0.3416 0.1434***
(1,290.6792) (0.4111) (0.0401)
Religious organization −1,606.7106 0.3312 −0.0466
(1,166.1896) (0.5857) (0.0602)
NGO −2,557.9972 0.7308** −0.0822
(2,521.8525) (0.3527) (0.0728)
Non-bank −1,930.1692 1.6658** −0.1872**
(2,504.2784) (0.6494) (0.0806)
Bank −2,524.7437 2.3336** −0.2099**
(3,992.8307) (1.0651) (0.1055)
Coop 3,843.7740 1.3902** −0.2162*
(3,551.6547) (0.5984) (0.1105)
Group lending 82.3783 −0.0524 0.0214
(525.3579) (0.2298) (0.0268)
Constant −32,712.4700*** −1.0653 1.2537***
(8,845.9372) (1.9017) (0.3633)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 976 645 176
Number of MFIs 277 201 139
Hausman test (p-value) 0.2034 0.0000 0.3599
R-squared (overall) 0.6376 0.1521 0.4716
Chi-squared 827.32*** 66.19*** 229.78***
This table lists Random effects estimates of the link between microfinance
‘plus’ and social performance of MFIs. Clients is the number of active
clients an MFI has, Average loan size is the amount of loan disbursed per
borrower scaled by gross domestic product per capita, and women is a
percentage of female clients. Regressors are defined previously. In par-
entheses are robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
respectively.
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neutralised by the disadvantages associated with it,
hence, leaving a negligible net impact on MIFs’
performance.
The no-results reported in this study actually
offers important policy lessons for MFIs. With
this information, microfinance practitioners are
informed that, adopting the maximalist approach
causes no harm on their overall financial and
social performance. Thus, if the ‘plus’ services are
of value for the customers the provision of such
does not harm the performance of the MFI. We do
however recognize that the design and the cost
structure of the ‘plus’ service does of course
Table 7. The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial
sustainability.
(13) (14) (15)
Variables OSS FSS ROA
BDS −0.0114 −0.0302 −0.0099
(0.0514) (0.0339) (0.0106)
SS −0.0023 0.0017 0.0066
(0.0492) (0.0326) (0.0104)
HDI −0.0794 −0.0837 0.0598
(0.2881) (0.2324) (0.0592)
GDP growth 0.0030 0.0064* 0.0014
(0.0050) (0.0034) (0.0010)
MFI size 0.1507*** 0.1551*** 0.0350***
(0.0260) (0.0191) (0.0048)
MFI experience −0.0090 −0.0067 0.0003
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0009)
Inflation −0.1246 −0.6438*** 0.0731
(0.3045) (0.2235) (0.0591)
International network −0.0485 −0.0112 0.0007
(0.0563) (0.0573) (0.0104)
NGO 0.5578** 0.5296*** 0.0591*
(0.2845) (0.1549) (0.0355)
Non-bank 0.4077 0.4339*** 0.0363
(0.2826) (0.1422) (0.0348)
Credit officers −0.0025*** −0.0024*** −0.0007***
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0002)
Group lending 0.0611 0.0429* 0.0252***
(0.0386) (0.0242) (0.0074)
Religious organization −0.0386 −0.0808 −0.0208
(0.0630) (0.0653) (0.0129)
Bank 0.5090* 0.4489** 0.0549
(0.2963) (0.1986) (0.0402)
Coop 0.5225* 0.5182*** 0.0460
(0.2833) (0.1609) (0.0370)
Constant −1.4732** −1.7077*** −0.5844***
(0.6083) (0.3850) (0.1012)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 628 654 1,104
Number of MFIs 196 211 317
Chi-squared 106.24*** 262.62*** 199.78***
Sagran-Hansen (P-value) 0.6688 0.1783 0.2927
This table presents estimates of the Hausman-Taylor model. Our endogen-
ous regressors are credit officers, BDS, SS, and Group lending, of which
credit officers is time varying and the rest are time-invariant. The remain-
ing regressors are considered exogenous. Time varying exogenous vari-
ables are HDI, GDP growth, MFI size, MFI experience and inflation. The
remaining exogenous regressors are time invariant. Variables are defined
in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses.*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.10.
Table 8. The link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial
sustainability.
(16) (17) (18)







BDS 0.1630 0.0109 0.0009
(0.1221) (0.1047) (0.0132)
SS −0.0864 0.0743 0.0011
(0.1477) (0.1745) (0.0131)
HDI −0.2846 0.3117 0.0236
(0.2883) (0.6601) (0.0646)
GDP growth −0.0007 0.0128 0.0012
(0.0060) (0.0124) (0.0008)
MFI size 0.0468* 0.0703 0.0025
(0.0266) (0.0725) (0.0031)
MFI experience 0.0019 −0.0201 −0.0009*
(0.0067) (0.0205) (0.0005)
Inflation 0.1433 −0.1500 0.0550
(0.5422) (0.6218) (0.0749)
Credit officers −0.0010 −0.0007 −0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0001)
International network 0.0518 −0.0541 0.0036
(0.0593) (0.1124) (0.0045)
Religious organization 0.0003 −0.0590 0.0085
(0.0464) (0.0993) (0.0075)
NGO −4.5378 4.1261 −0.1938
(5.3656) (6.0511) (0.3040)
Non-bank −4.7924 4.3736 −0.2106
(5.4818) (6.3937) (0.3170)
Bank −4.4579 4.0063 −0.1954
(5.3021) (5.9865) (0.3022)
Coop −4.5834 4.0857 −0.2145
(5.3237) (6.0198) (0.3056)
Group lending −0.0672 −0.0698 −0.0046
(0.0678) (0.0642) (0.0120)
Constant 4.7866 −4.7093 0.1909
(5.4758) (7.0737) (0.3576)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 466 472 844
Number of MFIs 187 201 305
Number of instruments 41 41 43
Chi-squared 229.83*** 210.41*** 321.87***
AR(1) test (P-value) 0.045 0.033 0.000
AR(2) test (P-value) 0.412 0.296 0.792
Hansen test (P-value) 0.800 0.284 0.176
This table lists system GMM (generalized methods of moments) results of
the link between microfinance ‘plus’ and financial sustainability of MFIs.
OSS is operational self-sustainability and measures the ability of MFI to
cover its operational costs from revenue, FSS is financial self-sustainability
and measures the ability of MFI to cover operational costs from revenue
without subsidies and ROA is returns on assets. Regressors are defined
previously. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first-and second-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the
null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. In specifying the two-step
System GMM model, we use lags of: dependent variables, BDS and SS as
GMM instruments allowing the default lags limits in Stata. ‘By default,
gmmstyle() generates the instruments appropriate for predetermined
variables: lags 1 and earlier of the instrumenting variable for the trans-
formed equation and, for system GMM, lag 0 of the instrumenting
variable in differences for the levels equation’ (Roodman 2009, 124).
The exogenous regressors are also standard instrumental variables, and
the ‘collapse’ option is used to limit instrument proliferation. In parenth-
eses are robust standard errors.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
respectively.
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influence the outcome for the client as well as the
MFI. Our study only shows that MFIs offering
‘plus’ services today have on average been able to
design these in such a way that they do not harm
the performance of the MFIs. We thus recommend
future studies to look deeper into how the design
and cost structure of ‘plus’ services have an influ-
ence on the MFI performance. Likewise, an inter-
esting area for future researchers could be an
investigation of how ‘smart subsidies’ (Morduch
2007) might account for the additional costs of
providing ‘plus’ services, as well as how coordi-
nated nonfinancial services provided by non-
MFIs, in cooperation with MFIs, might influence
MFI performance. Finally, like Berge, Bjorvatn, and
Tungodden (2014), studies are much warranted on
whether or not different ‘plus’ services actually
enhance clients’ impacts.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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